How Digital Sovereignty Works: Journey to the Center of the Stack
We examine how power and dependency move through apps, embedded code, operating systems, networks, and hardware. Drawing on international case studies, we trace the companies and countries supporting digital services, and what happens when those relationships come under pressure.
By: Elkenson
May 22nd, 2026
Key findings
An app’s branding can conceal relationships established through its suppliers. Reuters found Russian connections behind Pushwoosh, whose software appeared in CDC and U.S. Army apps despite its presentation as an American company. Separately, Snyk’s 2020 investigation found URL interception and advertising attribution manipulation in examined versions of Mintegral’s iOS SDK. These cases show why assessing a product requires examining its components.
Apps share services and infrastructure. Russia’s 2018 attempt to block Telegram disrupted unrelated services using the same cloud address ranges. Restrictions affecting Huawei’s access to Google services exposed dependencies within other applications running on its devices. The report examines how pressure directed at one company can travel through technical relationships into other countries and sectors.
A domestic app store still relies on an operating system, devices, and chip architectures. Russia’s RuStore illustrates why replacing a visible service does not establish control over everything supporting it. The report argues for assessing which dependencies matter most, where substitution is practical, and what would keep essential services operating during disruption.
Significance
Ownership reviews and supplier declarations provide only part of the picture. Technical dependencies determine who can support, interrupt, or change a service, while corporate relationships and jurisdiction shape the conditions under which that power may be exercised. The practical questions are which functions depend on external suppliers, what would fail if access changed, and whether credible alternatives exist.
Methods and scope
We synthesized published technical investigations, corporate disclosures, official materials, and contemporary reporting. The analysis follows five layers: visible applications, embedded components, operating systems, data transit, and physical infrastructure.
Limitations
This is a comparative strategic analysis, rather than a systematic audit of every product discussed. Technical findings come from the cited investigations and apply to their examined versions and periods.
Sources and supporting evidence
The full report contains the case studies and references. Supporting materials include Snyk’s Mintegral investigation and Reuters’ Pushwoosh investigation.
Suggested citation
Elkenson. “How Digital Sovereignty Works: Journey to the Center of the Stack.” May 22, 2026.